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4.1 Introduction
We see “globalization” everywhere. The nineteenth century saw falls in
the costs of transporting goods across oceans that made large-scale inter-
continental trade in staples rather than just curiosities and luxuries possible
for the ﬁrst time in human history (see O’Rourke and Williamson 1998;
Findlay and O’Rourke, ch. 1 in this volume). It also saw mass ﬂows of cap-
ital and mass migration on an extraordinary scale (see Lewis 1978). The sec-
ond half of the twentieth century saw a further advance in international
economic integration. It is hard to argue today that there is any dimen-
sion—trade, communication, intellectual property, ideas, capital ﬂows, the
scope of entrepreneurial control—save that of mass migration in which we
today are less “globalized” than our predecessors at the end of World WarI.
By contrast, we do not see “convergence” everywhere. We certainly see
convergence at some times and in some places. We see it in the sample of
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
economies after World War II (see Dowrick and Nguyen 1989). We see it in
East Asia after 1960 (see World Bank 1994). We believe we see the rapid
growth in real incomes and productivity levels, the rapid adoption and
adaptation of industrial-core technologies, and the shifts in economic struc-
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comments.ture that are the hallmarks of the process of convergence to world leading-
edge economies in China and in India today (see Sachs 2000). During the
interwar period, there were signs that economies as diverse as Soviet Rus-
sia, colonial Ghana, and Argentina were closing the gap that separated
them from the world’s industrial core. But these examples of successful con-
vergence have been much more the exception than the rule. Looking at the
world as a whole, what convergence there has been has been limited in geo-
graphy and in time. The rule has been, instead, “divergence, big time” (see
Pritchett 1997).
Baumol and Wolﬀ (1988) set out the idea that it would be fruitful to an-
alyze the pattern of world economic growth in terms of membership in a
“convergence club.” Their insight was that it would be fruitful to distinguish
between those economies in which the forces that economists would expect
to be generating convergence were strong enough to overwhelm counter-
pressures, and those economies in which economists’ expectations were not
coming to pass. Lucas (2000) showed that such a framework with the as-
sumption of a once-and-for-all switch for an economy’s joining the conver-
gence club could account in a stylized fashion for much of the global expe-
rience of the past two centuries.
In this paper we seek to push Baumol and Wolﬀ’s insight as far as we can.
We do not believe that we can put forward a convincing causal analysis of
why economies join (and leave) the convergence club. We restrict ourselves
much more to description—description of geographic patterns and of cor-
relations between measures of globalization and the power of forces mak-
ing for convergence.
Our conclusions are four tentative theses about the extent of convergence
and the relationship of convergence to globalization:
• The ﬁrst era of globalization—the knitting together of the world econ-
omy into a single unit in which staples could be proﬁtably traded across
oceans in the years before World War I—was essential in spreading the
possibility of convergence beyond the narrow North Atlantic. Suc-
cessful economic growth and industrial development in what Lewis
(1978) called the temperate economies of European settlement was
possible only because of this degree of economic integration (see
O’Rourke and Williamson 1998).
• However, outside the charmed circle made up of the western European
economies plus the temperate economies of European settlement, the
ﬁrst era of globalization in 1870–1914 did not bring convergence. It
brought much structural change and economic integration—the rub-
ber plant to Malaya, the tea plant to Ceylon, the coﬀee bean to Brazil.
It brought large-scale migration—workers from China to Java, from
India to South Africa, from Japan to Peru. But the relative gap in in-
come and productivity and the gap in industrial structure vis-à-vis the
industrial core of the world economy continued to widen.
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the world’s convergence club was signiﬁcantly expanding. Pieces of
coastal Africa, much of Latin America, and the Stalin-ruled Soviet
Union appeared to be closing the relative gap that separated their
economies from those of the world’s industrial core.
• The post–World War II period has brought an expansion in the size but
also a shift in the location of the world’s convergence club. First, the
OECD economies—as they were deﬁned in the 1980s—have eﬀec-
tively completed the process of convergence. Second, there is the East
Asian miracle, which has seen the fastest-growing economies any-
where, any time. Third, successful post-1980 development in China
and India has put countries that together amount for two-ﬁfths of
the world’s population “solidly on the escalator to modernity,” in
Lawrence Summers’s (1994) phrase. However, these episodes of suc-
cessful economic growth and convergence have been counterbalanced
by many economies’ loss of their membership in the world’s conver-
gence club. Consider the stagnation of late-Communist and post-
Communist economies, the disappointment of post-WWII growth in
much of Latin America, especially in the southern cone, and the ex-
treme disappointment of Africa’s postcolonial economic performance.
If correct, these theses seem to immediately raise three large questions.
First, why the limited extent of convergence under the ﬁrst globalized econ-
omy in the decades before 1914? The integrating world economy was pow-
erful enough to move tens of millions of people across oceans and shape
crop and livestock patterns in Java, central Brazil, and Ceylon as well as on
the pampas and in the outback. Yet it was not strong enough to induce con-
vergence outside the narrow charmed circle. Second, why did the area sub-
ject to convergence enlarge in the interwar period, when by and large the
forces of globalization have been in retreat? Third, what were the forces be-
hind the change in the shape of the convergence club after World War II?
However, the narratives and analyses we provide do not provide convincing
answers to these questions.
4.2 Joining and Leaving the Convergence Club
4.2.1 Economists’ Expectations
Some thirty years ago, geopoliticians and commentators spoke often of
the countries of the globe as divided into three “worlds”: ﬁrst, second, and
third. To be of the third world was to try to play oﬀthe United States against
the Soviet Union (and hopefully receive large amounts of aid from both).
To be of the third world was to stress the diﬀerences between one’s own
polity and economy and those of the industrial core grouped around the
North Atlantic. To be of the third world was to be—relatively—poor.
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still useful. It underscores the diﬀerences—the sharp economic divergence
in living standards and productivity levels—in the world today. To use the
more common “developed” and “developing” nomenclature for groups of
countries is to suggest that diﬀerences are narrowing, that countries are
converging. However, this is not the case—at least not for most of the post-
WWII period. Those economies that were relatively rich at the start of the
twentieth century have by and large seen their material wealth and pros-
perity explode. Those nations and economies that were relatively poor have
grown richer too, but for the most part much more slowly. And the relative
gulf between rich and poor economies has grown steadily.
That the pattern of economic growth over the twentieth century is one of
striking divergence is surprising to economists, for economists expect con-
vergence. World trade, migration, and ﬂows of capital should all work to
take resources and consumption goods from where they are cheap to where
they are dear. As they travel with increasing speed and increasing volume as
transportation and communication costs fall, these commodity and factor-
of-production ﬂows should erode the diﬀerences in productivity and living
standards between continents and between national economies.
Moreover, most of the edge in standards of living and productivity levels
held by the industrial core is no one’s private property, but instead the com-
mon intellectual and scientiﬁc heritage of humankind. Here every poor
economy has an excellent opportunity to catch up with the rich by adopt-
ing and adapting from this open storehouse of modern machine technology.
Yet economists’ expectations have, throughout the past century, been dis-
appointed, whether the expectations were those of John Stuart Mill that the
spread of democracy, literacy, and markets would develop the world; or of
Karl Marx that the British millowners’ building of a network of railroads
across India would backﬁre and have long-run consequences the millown-
ers had never envisioned.
We can view this particular glass either as half empty or as half full. It is
half empty in that we live today in the most unequal world (at least in terms
of the divergence in the relative lifetime income prospects of children born
into diﬀerent economies) ever seen. It is half full in that most of the world
has already made the transition to sustained economic growth. Most
people today live in economies that, while far poorer than the leading-edge
postindustrial nations of the world’s economic core, have successfully
climbed onto the escalator of modern economic growth.
4.2.2 The Idea of the Convergence Club
Why have economists been disappointed in their expectation that eco-
nomic forces—international trade, international migration, international
investment, and technology transfer—will gradually smooth out the enor-
mous gaps in productivity levels, real incomes, and living standards around
the world?
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gin thinking about this problem by examining the membership over time of
the convergence club, which they deﬁned as that set of economies where the
forces of technology transfer, increased international trade and investment,
and the spread of education were powerful enough to drive productivity lev-
els and industrial structures to (or at least toward) those of the industrial
core. Baumol and Wolﬀ believed that examining how it is that economies
enter and fall out of this convergence club should reveal clues to what are
the particular economic, political, and institutional blockages that keep
convergence the exception in the world today, and not the rule.1
Steve Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen were the ﬁrst to powerfully argue
that the countries that belonged to the OECD had converged over the
course of the post-WWII period (see Dowrick and Nguyen 1989). Conver-
gence could work powerfully if circumstances and institutions were suﬃ-
ciently favorable. In the case of the OECD after World War II, the set of
countries that converged by and large shared a common social-democratic
political setup, a common mixed-economy market-oriented economic
setup, and a commitment to cutting back on protectionist barriers and to
an open world economy.2But the set of OECD economies were not the only
ones that belonged to the world’s convergence club in the post-WWII pe-
riod. Before we can begin to answer Baumol and Wolﬀ’s question and ana-
lyze the relationship of globalization and convergence, we need to map the
size of the world’s convergence club.
4.2.3 Mapping the Convergence Club
The task, therefore, is to examine the evolution of the world’s conver-
gence club over time by taking snapshots of its membership during four
diﬀerent eras over the past two centuries: 1820–70, 1870–1913, 1913–50,
and 1950–2000. Moreover, it is important to be somewhat sophisticated in
how we deﬁne convergence. When growth macroeconomists use the word
convergence, they tend to think of a reduction in the variance of the distri-
bution of output per worker levels (or total factor productivity levels, or real
wage levels) across countries, or possibly of an erosion over time of initial
edges or deﬁcits in relative productivity vis-à-vis other national economies.
But for a historically oriented economist, convergence means something
somewhat diﬀerent. It means the assimilation of countries outside north-
west Europe of the institutions, technologies, and productivity levels cur-
rently in use in northwest Europe and in the rest of the industrial core. What
you are converging to is thus a moving target.
Moreover, it is as much a structural and organizational target as a target
indicated by levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per worker. The World
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1. There is in this notion of a convergence club an implicit (and largely valid) critique of one-
size-ﬁts-all cookie-cutter growth regressions that search for one common law of motion to ap-
ply to the whole world, as found in, for example, DeLong (1988).
2. Or so DeLong and Eichengreen (1994) argued.Bank reports that Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Emirates certainly
have levels of GDP per worker and standards of living equivalent to those
of Western Europe. Yet we would not want to claim that they have con-
verged to the industrial core. Before World War II there were periods of as
long as a generation during which Argentine or Australian productivity lev-
els were falling relative to those of the industrial core, either because of de-
clining terms of trade or because of prolonged drought (see Butlin 1970).
However, throughout such periods the Argentine and Australian economies
were building up their industrial sectors and raising their economies’ edu-
cational levels. In economic structure they were thus converging to the in-
dustrial core, even if they were losing relative ground in terms of standards
of living and value of output per worker (see Diaz-Alejandro 1970).
So our deﬁnition of which economies are in the convergence club over a
time period is not merely those countries in which GDP per capita as a pro-
portion of the North Atlantic level rose over the time period in question. It
looks at the extent of industrial development and structural change as well.
4.2.4 The Convergence Club, 1820–70
By 1820 the British industrial revolution was in full swing. The steam en-
gine was nearly a century old. The automated textile mill was no longer a
novelty. The long-distance railroad was on the horizon. As the pace of
structural change and industrial development accelerated in Great Britain,
its technologies began to diﬀuse elsewhere, to the continent of Europe and
overseas to North America.
As Sidney Pollard (1981, 45–46) put it, the process of diﬀusion
found no insuperable obstacles in [spreading to continental Europe]....
The regions of Europe diﬀered, however, very greatly in their prepared-
ness....  T h e r e  w a s  ...  a n  “inner” Europe . . . closest . . . to the social and
economic structure . . . in Britain. Surrounding that core . . . other areas
...   less prepared....  M o r e o v e r ,  this conquest did not proceed indeﬁnitely
outward....   [T]here came a line where the process stopped, sometimes
for generations, and, in some cases, until today. Beyond it . . . only scat-
tered outposts, too weak to aﬀect much the surrounding country....  
As time passed, the process of diﬀusion gathered force and the size of the
convergence club grew.
In the beginning the convergence club was very small. Between 1820 and
1870 it was, as Pollard (1981) notes, limited to Great Britain itself, Belgium,
and the northeastern United States. Industrialization had begun to spread
elsewhere, to Canada, to the rest of the United States, to the Netherlands,
to Germany, to Switzerland, to what is now Austria, to what is now the
Czech Republic, and to France. However, all of these economies found
themselves further from Great Britain in industrial structure in 1870 than
they had been back in 1820.3
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3. See Pollard (1981), Maddison (1994), and Landes (1969).Note that here the focus on industrial structure rather than economy-
wide productivity or labor productivity makes the biggest diﬀerence. The
labor-scarce U.S. west and Canada certainly had higher real wages than
Great Britain by the end of this period, as did labor-scarce Australia and
New Zealand. The Netherlands was in all probability more prosperous in
overall terms than Great Britain in 1820, and even in 1870 the productivity
and living standard gap was relatively small.4 But on an industrial-
structure and an industrial-technology deﬁnition of convergence, the pri-
mary product-producing economies, even the richest ones like Canada, do
not belong in the convergence club before 1870. They are rich primary-
sector-based economies, not industrializing economies. And the Nether-
lands, also, is not yet an industrializing economy: It is still a rich mercan-
tile economy. To the extent that one takes industrialization as the key
measure of modernity or development in the middle and late nineteenth
century, the mid-nineteenth-century convergence club (see ﬁg. 4.1) was
very small indeed.5
4.2.5 The Convergence Club, 1870–1914
Between 1870 and 1914 the convergence club expands considerably.
What  Arthur Lewis called the countries of temperate European settle-
ment—Canada, the western United States, Australia, and New Zealand,
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4. Indeed, the most parsimonious hypothesis explaining the slow industrialization of the
Netherlands in the mid-nineteenth century is that Dutch workers had more productive and
proﬁtable things to do than work in the dark satanic mills and forges of the early industrial rev-
olution. You can get coal to Amsterdam almost as cheaply as to Brussels, but real wages were
much lower in the second than in the ﬁrst; hence, that is where the mills were located. See
Mokyr (1976).
5. It is, of course, debatable whether one should focus so exclusively on machines, factories,
and manufacturing, and give the development of those sectors priority over wealth as deﬁned
by output per worker.
Fig. 4.1 The world’s “convergence club” ca. 1850
Note: Solid black: economies that are members of the “convergence club.”plus Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and perhaps South Africa—clearly belong
to the convergence club (see Lewis 1978). They are rich and are experienc-
ing (for the most part) rapid income growth. But they are also making use
of industrial technology, building up their materials-processing and factor
sectors, and becoming industrial economies. Australia started the period as
the sheep-raising equivalent of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) of the late nineteenth century, but by the beginning of
World War I it was clearly well on the way to being a successfully industri-
alizing economy. Argentina before World War I had a large and rapidly
growing portion of its labor force employed in railroads and in food pro-
cessing. By 1913 Buenos Aires ranked in the top twenty world cities in terms
of telephones per capita.
The successful spread of the convergence club to include the economies
of temperate European settlement is an achievement of the ﬁrst, 1870–
1914, era of globalization. The coming of the steamship and the telegraph
made the transoceanic shipment of staple commodities economically feasi-
ble for the ﬁrst time in human history. However, ocean transport was not so
cheap as to make it economically eﬃcient to do all materials and food pro-
cessing in the industrial core of northwest Europe and the northeast United
States. Buenos Aires, Melbourne, Santiago, Toronto, and San Francisco
became manufacturing as well as trade and distribution centers. And the
ease of transport and communication brought about by this ﬁrst late-
nineteenth-century global economy made the technology transfer to enable
this “rich peripheral” industrialization feasible.
In this period also the Industrial Revolution, and thus the convergence
club, spread to include nearly all the countries of inner Europe: Belgium,
the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain (but probably not
yet Portugal), Italy (even if surely not its south), Austria, what is now Hun-
gary, what is now the Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
and Ireland (see Pollard 1981). Beyond that line, however, the convergence
club did not extend, in spite of small and weak enclaves of industrialization.
With one exception, the relative gap in per capita productivity and indus-
trial structure between the industrial core and economies like Russia,
Turkey, Egypt, and the rest was wider in 1914 than it had been in 1870. That
one exception was Japan (see Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973).
The failure of the tropical primary-product-producing regions to join the
convergence club in the 1870–1914 period marks the limited scale of this
ﬁrst era of globalization. International trade, international investment, in-
ternational migration, and international conquest profoundly aﬀected eco-
nomic, social, and political structures throughout the world. The British
Empire brought the rubber plant to Malaysia. British investors ﬁnanced the
movement of indentured workers south from China to Malaysia to work
the plantations to produce the rubber to satisfy demand back in the world
economy’s core. The British Empire brought the tea plant from China to
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across the strait to work the plantations to produce the tea to satisfy de-
mand from the British actual and would-be middle classes. But these did not
trigger any rapid growth in real wages. They did not trigger any acceleration
in productivity growth or industrialization. They did not trigger any rapid
growth in factory employment, or any convergence to the world’s economic
core (see Lewis 1978).
The convergence club remained of limited size, not touching continental
Asia at all, and barely touching Africa and Latin America (see ﬁg. 4.2).6
4.2.6 The Convergence Club, 1914–50
The enormous physical destruction wrought by two world wars, coupled
with the enormous economic destruction of the Great Depression, makes it
diﬃcult to discern trends between 1914 and 1950. By 1950 the gap in pro-
ductivity and living standards between Japan and the United States was
larger than it had been in 1914. But does this mean that Japan had fallen
further behind in technology and industrial structure? Perhaps, but perhaps
not: It depends whether you take the as your benchmark the industrial
structure of still war-ravaged Japan in 1950, or the level and quality of the
technologies being installed in the rebuilding Japan, which were much
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Fig. 4.2 The world’s “convergence club” ca. 1900
Notes: Solid black: economies that are members of the “convergence club.” Diagonal ﬁll:
economies that might be members of the “convergence club.”
6. W. Arthur Lewis (1978) argued that it was the particular position of China and India in
the Malthusian cycle at the end of the nineteenth century that gave rise to this peculiar wage
increase–less, structural change–less form of development and growth, that whatever increases
in demand for labor in the tropical periphery were produced by the ﬁrst era of globalization
were overwhelmed by the elastic supply of potential migrant labor from China and India. But
an equally valid way to look at it is not that migrant labor supply from China and India was
remarkably large, but that the amount of increased trade between tropical periphery and in-
dustrial core was relatively small.closer to world best practice in 1950 than in 1914 and which by the 1970s
would have world-leading productivity levels in some industries (see Patrick
and Rosovsky 1976).
We argue, once again, for the second deﬁnition—we want to compare
relative technology, industrial structure, and productivity gaps in 1914 to
what they would have been in 1950 had postwar reconstruction been com-
pleted. Thus, from our perspective, Japan and its inner empire of Korea and
Taiwan deﬁnitely belong in the convergence club over the extended interwar
period from 1914 to 1950 (see ﬁg. 4.3). During this interwar period the
southern United States joins the convergence club. Its long economic de-
cline relative to the industrial core comes to an end in this period (see
Wright 1978). The Soviet Union joins as well. Stalinist industrialization was
a disaster for human life, social welfare, and economic eﬃciency, but it was
a powerful motor of industrialization. Elsewhere in Europe, however, there
was little expansion in the convergence club.
However, the convergence club did expand outside of Europe. In Latin
America, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil appear to have joined. Brazilian real
GDP per capita appears to have more than doubled in the years 1913–50
(see Maddison 2001). Because of the discovery and exploitation of oil,
Venezuelan GDP per capita grew more than sixfold.
In Africa, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and per-
haps other regions appear to make progress (see Hopkins 1973). French
North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—closed some of the rela-
tive gap between themselves and Western Europe (see Dumont 1966). Per
capita income in such economies appears to grow as rapidly as in the in-
dustrial core. There are signs of, if not widespread industrialization, at least
widespread integration of plantation and smallholder agriculture into the
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Fig. 4.3 The world’s “convergence club” in the interwar period
Notes: Solid black: economies that are members of the “convergence club.” Diagonal ﬁll:
economies that might be members of the “convergence club.”world economy. Whether this is suﬃcient structural change to qualify for
full-ﬂedged membership in the convergence club is debatable.
An optimist—a John Stuart Mill, say, looking for knowledge, education,
trade, and markets to bring the whole world together in a march to a liberal
utopia7—might have looked at the world in 1950 and been relatively opti-
mistic. Naziism had been defeated. Communism was a bloody and author-
itarian form of economic growth, but it might well become less bloody and
less authoritarian over time. And elsewhere the convergence club was
clearly growing, even if it was growing less rapidly than one would wish.
4.2.7 The Convergence Club, 1950–2000
However, the next period—the period between 1950 and 2000, which
we have just lived through—has brought surprises. The convergence club
both expanded and contracted massively, as for the ﬁrst time many econo-
mies joined and, also for the ﬁrst time ever, many economies dropped out.
In Latin America, countries like Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay exhibited stunning relative economic declines over the last half
century. Argentine relative income levels had declined during 1913 to 1950,
as the value of primary products fell, but its industrial structure had con-
verged toward industrial-core norms. But between 1950 and 2000 the sec-
toral distribution of the labor force froze, and Argentinians lost a third of
their relative income vis-à-vis the industrial core.
Coastal West Africa fell out of the convergence club (if it had ever be-
longed in the ﬁrst place); coastal East Africa fell out as well (if it, too, had
ever belonged). South Africa did not maintain modern economic growth
fast enough to close the gap with the industrial core over the second half of
the twentieth century, and educational and industrial structure gaps vis-à-
vis Western Europe grew substantially. Purchasing power parity–concept
GDP per capita in South Africa was perhaps a quarter of that in the indus-
trial core in 1950, and is less than a sixth of that in the industrial core today.8
Moreover, the countries of French North Africa fell out of the conver-
gence club: Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are today further behind France
in relative material productivity and industrial structure than they were in
1950. The former Soviet Union dropped its membership in the convergence
club as well. First came the stagnation that began in the mid-1970s as the
ability of the centrally planned system to deliver even its own kind of lim-
ited, resource- and capital-intensive economic growth eroded and eﬀec-
tively ended in the 1970s. Then came the collapse of economic activity in the
1990s that followed the end of communism.
This shrinkage of the convergence club during what was an era of ex-
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7. See Mill (1848).
8. Neighboring Botswana, however, has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the
world.panded international trade and massive moves toward an open world econ-
omy is remarkable, and very much counter to economists’ perhaps naïve
expectations. In each case the driving factors may have been political.
Agronomist Rene Dumont warned at the very beginning of African decol-
onization that the postcolonial governments were following policies that
destructively taxed agriculture and enriched relatively parasitic urban elites
(see Dumont 1966). The work of Robert Bates two decades later suggested
that little had changed (see Bates 1981).
Diaz-Alejandro (1970) and DeLong and Eichengreen (1994) argued that
the failure of the southern cone of South America in economic development
after World War II was largely a political failure. And the (largely political)
failure of the Soviet Union to live up to its potential both before and after
its disintegration is well known. If correct, this would suggest that all the
potential for international economic contact and technology transfer can-
not survive bad economic policies. It would, however, beg the question of
why such bad economic policies were so likely to be adopted by so many
countries in the half-century after World War II.
As these economies fell out of the convergence club, other economies
joined (see ﬁg. 4.4). The East Asian miracle took hold: Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (after
1965), and China (after 1978) clearly belong to the convergence club. Only
the unreformed socialist governments of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam keep them from joining the rest of east and Southeast Asia.9In the
Balkans, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria join the convergence club:
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Fig. 4.4 The world’s “convergence club” in recent years
Notes: Solid black: economies that are members of the “convergence club.” Vertical ﬁll:
economies that might be members of the “convergence club.” Horizontal ﬁll: economies that
used to belong to the convergence club, but have fallen out. Diagonal ﬁll: economies that
might have once belonged, but that have fallen out.
9. However, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea go their own way as well.Once again centrally planned economies succeed in growth at a particular
stage of early industrialization, albeit at a large human cost. In the eastern
Mediterranean, Greece, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt are now in the conver-
gence club. In Latin America, Colombia and Mexico join. After 1980, In-
dia begins not only to grow economically but to narrow the gap in aggregate
productivity and industrial structure (see Sachs et al. 2000).
In the ﬁrst (1870–1914) era of globalization its implications for the size of
the convergence club were clear. Globalization forces were suﬃcient to pull
the temperate economies of European settlement into the convergence
club, but insuﬃcient to pull any other regions into the club even though
they had powerful eﬀects on economic structure. In the second (1950–2000)
era of globalization, the implications of globalization for the size of the con-
vergence club are less clear. Why has it been such a friend to East Asia but
not to Latin America? Why has the eastern Mediterranean done so well and
the southwestern Mediterranean so badly? What explains the economic col-
lapse of Africa relative to the high hopes of the decolonization era and to
the 1914–50 interwar period?
4.3 Debating Convergence while Incomes Diverge
4.3.1 Is “Conditional Convergence” Meaningful?
Recent debates on growth theory have contrasted the convergence pre-
dictions of the neoclassical growth models of Swan (1956) and Solow (1956)
with predictions of potential nonconvergence from the newer models of en-
dogenous technological progress of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1998). Most of this debate has been in the context of closed economy mod-
elling. The standard neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to in-
vestment implies that each economy converges to its own steady-state level
of labor productivity. Higher rates of saving and lower rates of population
growth will raise the long-run level of income, but not its growth rate. Long-
run growth is simply the world’s rate of technical progress.
In this framework, empirical studies of short-run growth are predicted to
ﬁnd conditional convergence if they control for factor accumulation. A neg-
ative partial correlation between growth and initial income is conﬁrmation
of convergence toward steady state. (In the terms of modern time series
econometrics, it is evidence of cointegration between income levels and the
country-speciﬁc determinants of steady state.) Even when this negative par-
tial correlation is observed on cross-country data, it has no implications for
convergence across countries. Thus, studies such as Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) can ﬁnd strong conditional convergence, at a rate of around 2
or 3 percent per year, on postwar data covering both industrialized and
unindustrialized economies.
Over recent years, the use of panel data and higher levels of econometric
Globalization and Convergence 203sophistication (or sophistry?) have produced ever-increasing estimates of
the magnitude of the conditional convergence coeﬃcient. The annual rate
of global convergence since 1960 is estimated to be around 10 percent both
by Islam (1995) and by Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), whereas Lee,
Pesaran, and Smith (1998) suggest that the true ﬁgure is closer to 30 per-
cent.10This focus on conditional convergence has tended to obscure the fact
that, across the globe, income levels have actually been diverging rather
than converging over the past forty years.11
Perhaps the foremost advocate of the position that there has been or is
“convergence” in the world over the past ﬁfty years and today is Harvard
economist Robert Barro (1996). His work ﬁnds “strong support [for] the
general notion of conditional convergence”—that is, that if other things are
held equal then there is a strong tendency for countries to converge toward
a common level of total factor productivity, a common level of labor pro-
ductivity, and a common standard of living.
In Barro’s view, strong and powerful forces are pushing countries to-
gether. His regressions show that, on average, a country with the same value
of the other right-hand-side variables closes between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of
the log gap between it and the world’s industrial leaders each year. This
means that even a country as poor as Mozambique could—if it attained the
same values for the other right-hand-side variables—close half the (log) gap
between its level of productivity and that of the United States in sixteen to
twenty-nine years, and in such an eyeblink of historical time become as rich
and productive as Thailand or Panama or Lithuania is today.
The joker in the deck, of course, is the assumption that other things—the
other right-hand-side variables in Barro’s regression—could be made
equal. Barro’s other right-hand-side variables include an index of democ-
racy, an index of the rule of law, government noninvestment spending as a
share of GDP, life expectancy, the male secondary-school attendance rate,
and the fertility rate. And a moment’s thought will convince anyone that
these other right-hand-side variables could never be brought to the mean
values found in the industrial core of the world economy in any country that
has not already attained the productivity level and socioeconomic structure
found in the industrial core.
First and most important, consider the fertility rate. At extremely low
levels of income per capita—levels lower than found anywhere else in the
world today save in exceptional years—there is a positive Malthusian
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10. In this last case, the use of annual time series data and dummy variables for country-
speciﬁc exogenous technical progress may have resulted in the convergence coeﬃcient captur-
ing the average frequency of the business cycle.
11. We need to qualify this statement as referring to an unweighted measure of global in-
come dispersion. When population weights are applied, there is evidence of some decrease in
global income inequality—but this depends entirely on the rapid growth of average real in-
come in China over the past twenty years and in India over the past ﬁfteen years.causal relationship running from income to fertility. But once one passes
over this Malthusian peak, there is a strong negative causal relationship
running from income to fertility. In richer countries access to birth control
is easier, and birth control means that those who did not wish to have more
children could exercise their choice. Life expectancies are longer in richer
countries, so parents no longer need to birth four sons to be reasonably sure
that one will survive into middle age. Starting in eighteenth-century France
and continuing in every single country we have observed since, as the re-
sources and educational level of the average household rise, fertility falls.
The same argument applies to life expectancy and to educational levels
as well. These are things that are at least as much results of wealth and pro-
ductivity as causes of it. It is not possible to consistently imagine a coun-
terfactual world in which a poor country like Mozambique could have a
secondary-school enrolment rate and a life expectancy as high as those of
the industrial core.
For the third group of his right-hand-side variables, the “government
group” made up of the rule-of-law index, the democratization index, and
government noninvestment spending as a share of GDP, Barro has more of
a point. States that tax heavily and do not spend the proceeds on public in-
vestments, states too weak to enforce the rule of law or control the corrup-
tion of their functionaries, and states that rest not on the consent of the gov-
erned but on the bayonets of soldiers and the whispers of informers destroy
economic growth. But here, as well, the cause-and-eﬀect links run both
ways. Richer countries with larger tax bases aﬀord governments more re-
sources that they can use to enforce the rule of law and control the corrup-
tion of their own functionaries. In richer countries the rewards from
concentrating activity on the positive-sum game of production are greater
relative to the rewards of grasping for a redistribution of rents from the ex-
port trade.
For these reasons we ﬁnd demonstrations of convergence conditional on
fertility, life expectancy, education, and even on the structure and eﬀective-
ness of government to be of dubious value. A claim that convergence is a
powerful and active force in the world today but is masked by other factors
suggests that there is an alternative, counterfactual set of political and eco-
nomic arrangements in which that convergence would come to the forefront
and be clearly visible. Yet we can see no way of bringing the poor-country
values of Barro’s other right-hand-side variables to their rich-country
means that does not presuppose that full economic development has al-
ready been successfully accomplished.
This argument applies even more strongly to convergence regressions,
like those of DeLong and Summers (1991), that include measures of invest-
ment in their list of right-hand-side variables. A poor country will face a
high relative price of the capital equipment it needs to acquire in order to
turn its savings into productive additions to its capital stock. This should
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economies are the most industrialized and prosperous because they have at-
tained very high levels of manufacturing productivity: Their productivity
advantage in unskilled service industries is much lower than in capital- and
technology-intensive manufactured goods. The higher relative price of ma-
chinery in developing countries means that poor countries get less invest-
ment—a smaller share of total investment in real GDP—out of any given
eﬀort at saving some ﬁxed share of their incomes.
4.3.2 Development Traps, Conditional Convergence,
and Absolute Divergence
So the coexistence of actual divergence and conditional convergence re-
ﬂects the observation that some of the “conditioning” variables in the stan-
dard convergence regressions are distributed in such a way as to promote di-
vergence—in particular, faster population growth and lower rates of
investment in poorer countries. In autarkic models, this implies the exis-
tence of a development trap or poverty trap: A population living close to
subsistence is unable to mobilize the surplus required for substantial do-
mestic investment;12they will typically face high prices for imported capital
goods; they may well be caught in a prisoner’s dilemma whereby each fam-
ily substitutes quantity of children for quality of human capital investment
(schooling) in attempting to maximize family welfare, running afoul of di-
minishing returns to labor in the aggregate.
A related explanation for the limited range of convergence over the past
century and a half is put forward by Richard Easterlin (1981), who attrib-
utes limited convergence to a lack of formal education throughout much of
the world. As Easterlin puts it, the diﬀusion of modern economic growth
has depended principally on the diﬀusion of knowledge about the produc-
tive technologies developed during and since the Industrial Revolution, and
this knowledge cannot diﬀuse to populations that have not acquired the
traits and motivations produced by formal schooling. Political conditions
and ideological inﬂuences played the biggest role in restricting the spread of
formal education before World War II. But Easterlin looks forward to a
world in which formal education is universal, hence in which the blockages
to convergence have vanished.
Perhaps the most interesting contribution to this literature over the past
several decades has been that of Gregory Clark (1987), who suggests that
the chief obstacle to convergence was not the inability to transfer technol-
ogy to relatively poor economies, but the relative ineﬃciency of labor.
Clark studies the state of cotton mills worldwide around 1900 and ﬁnds
that the technologies of automated cotton-spinning had indeed been suc-
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12. Ben-David (1997) models exactly such a development trap by introducing the notion of
subsistence consumption into the neoclassical exogenous growth model.cessfully transferred all around the world: There were cotton mills not just
in Manchester and Lowell, but also in Tokyo, Shanghai, and Bombay, all
using the same technology and all equipped with machinery from the same
spinning-machine manufacturers in New England or in Lancashire. Yet,
according to Clark, labor productivity in factories equipped with the same
machines varied by a factor of ten-to-one worldwide, neatly oﬀsetting the
ten-to-one variation in real wages worldwide and so making the proﬁtabil-
ity of cotton-spinning mills approximately equal no matter where they
were located.
Clark points out that given the enormous gaps in real wages, something
like an equivalent gap in labor productivity was essential if competition
were  not to rapidly eliminate the cotton-spinning industry from large
chunks of the globe. Capital costs were much the same worldwide: Facto-
ries did use common sources of machines. Raw material costs varied, but
not grossly worldwide. Labor costs were the overwhelming bulk of total
costs. Thus, unless labor productivity varied directly and proportionately
with the real wage, a cotton-spinning mill in a low-wage economy would
have an overwhelming cost advantage. And competition would lead to an
international division of labor in which such low-wage economies domi-
nated the worldwide industry of a good as easily and cheaply tradable as
cotton thread.
Clark (1987) has been an extremely inﬂuential and disturbing paper for
the decade and a half since it was ﬁrst written. But its striking results may
be due to some peculiarity of the cotton-spinning industry, rather than with
the general nature of modern economic growth. Consider: In order for
Clark to do his comparisons of productivity levels in one industry across the
whole world, he needs to ﬁnd an industry that is not heavily concentrated in
one particular region or among one particular slice of the world income dis-
tribution. Thus, he needs to ﬁnd an industry in which it is proﬁtable to lo-
cate in a country no matter what that country’s level of real wages—in
which it is proﬁtable to locate in Manchester, Milan, or Mobile as well as in
Mumbai.
When will it be proﬁtable to locate an industry in a country no matter
what that country’s relative level of real wages? It will be proﬁtable if and
only if labor productivity in that industry is proportional to the local real
wage. Thus, Clark’s major conclusion—that in the cotton-spinning indus-
try at the turn of the last century there were extraordinary variations in la-
bor productivity that were roughly proportional to the local real wage—
could have been arrived at without any of his calculations just by observing
that there were cotton-spinning mills in Mumbai and also in Manchester.
But how common are industries like the cotton-spinning industry? How
much of the world’s industry is of this character, in which labor productiv-
ity is proportional to the local real wage? We know that it is not the case
today in toy manufacture: Mattel just closed down its last U.S. toy-
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ers and unions continue to demand protection against steel makers in Brazil
and Korea lest large chunks of their industry vanish. We know that it is not
the case in microprocessor manufacture or (Bangalore aside) software de-
sign. We know that it is not the case in grain agriculture.
There are some industries in which labor productivity worldwide is
roughly proportional to the local real wage. There are more industries in
which it is not: Either labor productivity varies less than the real wage (and
the industry tends to be concentrated in at least some relatively poor coun-
tries), or labor productivity varies more than the real wage (and the indus-
try tends to be concentrated in the richest and most technologically capable
economies). We are going to have to learn lessons from many more indus-
tries than just the cotton mills before we can understand why the whole
world is not developed.
Our picture of world development is one in which some economic forces
push in the direction of convergence while other forces are divergent. Glob-
alization is typically presumed to reinforce the convergent trend—through
the ﬂow of capital toward capital-poor economies, through trade-induced
factor price equalization, and through international knowledge spillovers.
Why might globalization have failed to produce convergence over the past
ﬁfty years?
Lucas (1990) suggests that human capital complementarity may block
the capital channel. The marginal product of capital in a capital-poor coun-
try may well be much higher than that in the United States, other things be-
ing equal. But typically those other things are not equal: in particular, the
availability of the skilled labor required to operate and adapt a new tech-
nology. When physical and human capital are complementary, the prob-
lems of moral hazard in human capital investment explain the failure of
international capital markets to invest in the capital-poor economies.
Similar problems are likely to impede the international transfer of tech-
nology, as is argued by Abramovitz (1986), who cites a lack of social capa-
bility as the major obstacle preventing the technologically backward from
absorbing the technological developments of the advanced economies. This
hypothesis is supported by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), who ﬁnd evidence
that the growth rate of total factor productivity depends on the national
stock of human capital.
4.3.3 Openness and Convergence
An alternative explanation for the failure of globalization to bring about
convergence comes from Sachs and Warner (1995). They have constructed
an index of openness for the twenty-year period 1970–89, in which the in-
dex takes the value of 1 for an open economy but a value of zero if the econ-
omy was closed according to at least one of the following ﬁve criteria:
208 Steve Dowrick and J. Bradford DeLong1. Tariﬀ rates averaging over 40 percent
2. Nontariﬀ barriers covering at least 40 percent of imports
3. A socialist economic system
4. A state monopoly of major exports
5. A black market premium of 20 percent or more on foreign currency
They ﬁnd evidence for the period 1970–89 of strong convergence in per
capita GDP among the group of countries classiﬁed as open, but no con-
vergence among the closed economies. The average growth premium for
opening an economy is estimated to be a massive 2.5 percentage points on
annual growth.
Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that globalization has indeed promoted
both growth and convergence (i.e., faster growth for poorer countries), but
only to those countries that allow relatively free movement of goods and
capital. In other words, those countries that have failed to catch up have
usually failed to jump on the globalization bandwagon.
The Sachs and Warner (1995) evidence has been criticized by Rodriguez
and Rodrik (1999). They ﬁnd that the crucial components of the Sachs-
Warner index are the measures of export monopoly and black market pre-
miums. These variables identify all but one of the sub-Saharan economies
in Africa plus a group of largely Latin American economies with major
macroeconomic and political diﬃculties. Rodriguez and Rodrik conclude
that “The [Sachs-Warner] measure is so correlated with plausible groupings
of alternative explanatory variables . . . that it is risky to draw strong infer-
ences about the eﬀect of openness on growth” (24).
We turn in the next section to an empirical examination of the robustness
of the Sachs-Warner result. We investigate whether their result holds for the
most recent decades, noting the contrary ﬁnding by Kevin O’Rourke (2000)
for the beginning of the last century.
4.4 Evidence on Openness and Convergence, 1960–98
Descriptive statistics are given in table 4.1 for real GDP per capita
(RGDP) for 109 countries in 1960, 1980, and 1998,13 using the Penn World
Tables 5.6a14 and World Bank estimates of real GDP growth in the 1990s.
We also report real GDP per member of the workforce (RGDPW) and real
GDP per capita as adjusted by Summers and Heston (1991) for changes in
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13. To reduce the inﬂuence of asynchronous business cycles, the data labeled 1960 are actu-
ally ﬁve-year averages for the period 1960–64; similarly, we give 1978–82 averages as 1980,
1988–92 as 1990, and 1994–98 as 1998.
14. We have identiﬁed some problems with the Penn World Tables data on population and
real GDP growth for 1960 and 1970 for a number of countries such as Nigeria. This should not











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1the terms of trade (RGDPTT). This terms-of-trade adjustment gives a bet-
ter measure of changes in average welfare than the ﬁxed-price measure.
These latter two measures are available only up until 1992.
Dispersion is measured by the variance of the logarithm. Other measures
of dispersion are often used, particularly in welfare analysis, but the log
variance is particularly useful in that it can be directly related to the regres-
sion analysis of growth rates. In the ﬁfth row of table 4.1 we report changes
in population-weighted variances for the whole sample (a measure appro-
priate to analysis of inequality across individuals), but for the rest of our
analysis we adopt a positivist approach to hypothesis testing and treat each
country’s performance over a period as a single, equally weighted observa-
tional unit.
All three measures show increasing dispersion. We have divided the
sample of 109 countries into three groups, depending on whether 1960
RGDP was above or below I$1,500 or I$5,000 (measured in constant inter-
national prices with the international dollar [I$] normalized to the pur-
chasing power of the U.S. dollar in 1985). Divergence has occurred within
each group, except for the richest nineteen countries between 1960 and
1980. But the principal cause of divergence has been the failure of the poor-
est to match the growth of the more developed.
Between 1960 and 1980, the middle-income countries grew fastest, at 3.2
percent per year, followed by the rich at 2.7 percent and the poorest at 2.1
percent. Over the subsequent two decades growth rates slowed for all
groups, with a meager 0.6 percent per year for the ﬁfty-ﬁve poorest
economies.
It is this falling-behind of the poorest countries, in a period of increasing
globalization, that we investigate. From table 4.2 we can see that the ﬁfty-
ﬁve poorest countries in 1960 are characterized, relative to the richer
groups, by high prices of investment goods and low rates of real investment,
by low levels of education, by high population growth, low values of open-
ness on the Sachs-Warner (S&W) index, low ratios of trade to GDP, and
low growth of the working-age population relative to total population.
These discrepancies are exaggerated if we examine the thirty-ﬁve slowest
growers within the poor group.
The regressions reported in table 4.3 replicate some of the analysis car-
ried out by Sachs and Warner (1995). We use the S&W distinction between
open and closed economies for the period 1960–80 to construct a dummy
variable equal to 1 for countries they deemed to be open for the period
1970–89. This restricts our sample to ninety-six countries. Since we are also
examining growth over the period 1980–98, we extend the S&W classiﬁca-
tion to our later period, reclassifying countries as open if S&W report that
they have been open for a signiﬁcant number of years since 1980; table 4.3
gives the details of our classiﬁcations. This enables us to check whether
the S&W results carry over to the 1990s—in particular for the twenty-four
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Rich Middle Poor Slowest Growers
Real GDP per capita ($)
1960 7,117 2,466 855 800
1980 11,475 4,579 1,385 978
1990 13,416 5,365 1,555 878
1990 14,788 6,398 1,808 885
RGDP growth rate 
(annual average)
1960–80 0.027 0.032 0.021 0.007
1980–98 0.015 0.013 0.006 –0.007
Proportion African 0.00 0.14 0.62 0.81
Proportion OECD 0.89 0.17 0.00 0.00
Proportion open
(extended Sachs-Warner)
1960–80 0.83 0.39 0.12 0.03
1980–98 0.88 0.75 0.32 0.22
(Imports + Exports)/GDP
1960–80 0.62 0.70 0.51 0.47
1980–98 0.71 0.85 0.62 0.54
Adjusted trade share
1960–80 0.01 –0.10 –0.22 –0.28
1980–98 0.20 0.17 0.10 –0.02
Real investment/GDP share
1960–80 0.26 0.20 0.11 0.08
1980–98 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.07
Relative price of investment 
goods
1960–80 1.02 1.35 2.37 2.89
1980–98 0.93 1.39 2.48 2.99
Average years of schooling
1960–80 4.7 3.8 2.4 2.0
1980–98 6.2 5.2 3.6 3.1
Population growth rate 
(annual average)
1960–80 0.010 0.020 0.025 0.026
1980–98 0.007 0.016 0.024 0.027
Growth of workforce/
population
1960–80 0.005 0.002 –0.003 –0.005
1980–98 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.000
Sources: Penn World Tables 5.6 at [http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/home.html] for trade share, in-
vestment share and price, and workforce/population up to 1992. World Bank (2000) for real
GDP and population. Sachs and Warner (1995) for open (for adjustments, see our table 4.3).
Barro and Lee (1993) and [http://www.nber.org/data/] for schooling, taken as average years of
schooling in the adult population over the ﬁrst decade.
Notes: The “rich” group is composed of nineteen countries with real GDP per capita 1960–64
averaging above I$5,000; the “poor” group comprises ﬁfty-ﬁve countries with RGDP 1960–64
averaging below I$1,500. The “middle” group comprises the remaining forty-ﬁve countries.
The “slow growers” are the thirty-ﬁve slowest-growing countries (1960–98) within the “poor”
group.poor and middle-income countries that have only recently opened their
economies.
Regression 1 in table 4.4 conﬁrms the S&W result that open economies
grew substantially and signiﬁcantly faster than closed economies over the
period 1960–80. Our estimate of a 2.0 percentage point growth premium is
only slightly lower than the S&W estimates for 1970–89. By any standards,
it is a huge premium—implying that twenty years of openness lifts per
capita GDP by a cumulative 50 percent.
When we interact openness with initial income, regression 2 indicates
that the growth premium for openness tends to be higher for poorer coun-
tries—averaging 3.4 percentage points compared with 1.0 points for rich
countries. This conﬁrms the S&W ﬁnding that openness promoted conver-
gence over the period 1960–80. The diﬀerences in growth rates for open and
closed economies are illustrated in ﬁgure 4.5, where the solid trend-line rep-
resents the predicted growth rate from a regression on a cubic polynomial
in log income.
Controlling for openness, these regressions show no evidence of condi-
tional convergence. Indeed, the beta coeﬃcients are positive: Conditional
on openness, there were additional factors slowing the growth of the poor-
est relative to the richest countries. Regression 3 conﬁrms that the usual sus-
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Table 4.3 Extension of the Sachs-Warner Classiﬁcations
Benin Open since 1990
Botswana Open since 1979
Chile Open since 1976
Colombia Open since 1986
Costa Rica Open since 1986
El Salvador Open since 1989
Gambia Reform 1985
Ghana Open since 1985
Guatemala Open since 1988
Guyana Open since 1988
Israel Open since 1985
Mali Open since 1988
Mexico Open since 1986
Morocco Open since 1984
New Zealand Open since 1986
Paraguay Open since 1989
The Philippines Open since 1988
Sri Lanka Open since 1991
Tunisia Open since 1989
Turkey Open since 1989
Uganda Open since 1988
Uruguay Open since 1990
Note:These countries, classiﬁed as closed by Sachs and Warner (1995) for the period 1970–89,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.pects were involved. Multiplying the regression coeﬃcients by the diﬀer-
ences in sample means from table 4.2, we ﬁnd that investment rates and
demographic diﬀerences accounted for 1.3 percentage points of slower
growth for the poor countries, relative to the group of rich countries.
Taking account of factor accumulation and of the diﬀerential eﬀects of
openness, we now ﬁnd some weak evidence of conditional convergence.
This should be interpreted as conditional convergence in multifactor pro-
ductivity, proceeding at a slow rate of only 0.4 percent per year, possibly re-
sulting from international technology transfer. Because the regression is
controlling for trade eﬀects, any such technology spillovers are not operat-
ing through trade.
We  have followed Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) by adding a variable
measuring the level of schooling in the adult population, and by adding the
product of schooling with initial income. Neither variable adds signiﬁcant
explanatory power.
We perform similar analysis to explain growth between 1980 and 1998
(see regressions 4–8 in part B of table 4.4). Openness appears to deliver a
smaller growth premium than that of the previous twenty years, although
1.3 percentage points is still a very substantial addition to annual growth
rates. The positive sign on the interactive term, introduced in regressions
5–8, suggests that poorer countries beneﬁt less from openness than do rich
countries. This is the opposite of the S&W ﬁnding, which we conﬁrmed for
the earlier period 1960–80. The diﬀerences in growth rates for open and
closed economies are illustrated in ﬁgure 4.6.
When we use the S&W measure of openness in the interactive term, we
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Fig. 4.5 Relative growth rates and initial income levels of “open” and “closed”
economies, 1960–80ﬁnd that neither of the variables is statistically signiﬁcant. In the reported
regressions 5–8, in order to reduce multicollinearity, we have used instead a
direct measure of trade openness, not the S&W variable, in the interactive
term. This measure, based on the observation that countries with small
populations tend to engage in more international trade than do more pop-
ulous nations, consists of the residuals from an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression that explains half of the observed variation in trade shares
over the pooled sample






     6.23   0.25 log (population); 
N   218, R2   0.498.
Regression 6 adds in control variables for investment and demography. We
calculate that, for the period 1980–98, the lower rate of capital deepening in
the poorer countries now explains 2.2 points of slower growth, relative to
the group of rich countries. Conditional convergence is statistically signiﬁ-
cant once we control for factor accumulation. The coeﬃcient of –0.008 on
the initial income term in regression 6 implies that, over the period 1980–
98, the technology gap between countries was eroded at a rate approaching
1 percent per year.
The seventh regression reported in part B of table 4.4 includes the School
and School   log (initial income) variables. These were found to be in-
signiﬁcant for the earlier period, but they add signiﬁcant explanatory power
in explaining growth over this later period. The sign pattern, positive on
School and negative on School   log(initial income), conﬁrms the Ben-
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Fig. 4.6 Relative growth rates and initial income levels of “open” and “closed”
economies, 1980–98habib and Spiegel (1994) ﬁnding that a high level of initial human capital
does promote growth, especially when initial income is low. It also provides
some support for the Abramovitz (1986) hypothesis that successful tech-
nology transfer requires a certain level of social capability—although it is
puzzling that the schooling variables are not signiﬁcant when the invest-
ment and demographic variables are added in regression 8.
A summary of our empirical ﬁndings runs as follows:
• The failure of the world’s poorest countries to catch up to the income
levels of the richest countries over the past four decades is attributable
to the poverty-trap conditions of subsistence income, low saving and
investment, low levels of education, and high fertility.
• Openness to the world economy does appear to provide a signiﬁcant
boost to growth, but it does not necessarily promote convergence. A
large number of the poorer countries have opened their economies
since 1980. But it is precisely during this period that the beneﬁts of
openness appear to have diminished.
4.5 Conclusion
Our historical narrative makes it clear that globalization of the economy
does not necessarily imply global convergence. Periods of expansion of
transport and trade and ﬂows of capital and migrants have marked the de-
velopment of a club of convergent economies, but countries outside the
club have fallen behind in relative terms even in eras of strong growth.
Moreover, over the past two decades many countries have fallen behind, not
just relatively but absolutely, in terms of both income levels and structural
development.
The fact that the news has been very good for India and China over the
past few decades has created a sharp division between the average experi-
ence of countries (in which divergence continues to be the rule, and in fact
to accelerate) and the average experience of people (in which, for the ﬁrst
time in centuries, there are signs of unconditionalconvergence). It is also ap-
parent that failure to join the convergence club is not just a consequence of
a country’s turning its back on the global economy and sheltering behind
tariﬀ barriers and capital controls. During the high years of the great Key-
nesian boom after World War II, openness to the world economy does ap-
pear to have been a magic bullet making for convergence, and those coun-
tries that closed their economies, whether in the southern cone of Latin
America or in postindependence Africa, suﬀered enormous penalties. But
things appear to have been somewhat diﬀerent in other eras. At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, it is hard to see openness to trade and migra-
tion as promoting convergence outside a small charmed circle—a point
Globalization and Convergence 217that was made by Lewis (1978) a generation ago. And at the end of the twen-
tieth century, the growth beneﬁts of opening up appear substantially lower
than in the twentieth century’s third quarter.
It remains an open question whether the growth beneﬁts of openness
have really declined in recent decades, or whether an early turn to openness
is correlated with other growth-promoting factors omitted from standard
cross-country studies.
In either case, there is little reason to be conﬁdent that opening doors to
the world economy will guarantee a place at the high table. Poor countries
remain poor, and so the purchase of investment goods from overseas that
embody technology and assist in technology transfer remains expensive,
and ﬁnding the resources to support mass education remains diﬃcult. Last,
the world’s poorest countries have still not successfully completed their de-
mographic transitions—and the failure to have shifted to a regime of low
population growth puts pressure on resources and capital accumulation
that will in all likelihood continue to sharpen the jaws of the poverty trap.
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Comment Charles I. Jones
I greatly enjoyed the opportunity to read and think about this interesting
paper. Its main contribution is to raise a number of important and fasci-
nating questions related to globalization and convergence. This is a valuable
contribution, and it provokes the reader to speculate about possible an-
swers. In this, I found the paper to be a great success: It drew me in and got
me thinking.
The main puzzle described in the paper involves changes in the relation-
ship between globalization and convergence over time. It appears to be the
case that countries that have taken their place at the global table in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century have grown faster than those that have
not, and countries that have opened their economies have exhibited some
convergence. The exact magnitude of this growth gain is uncertain, and the
eﬀects may have weakened toward the end of the century (as Dowrick and
DeLong argue), but this is a point that is not greatly disputed.1On the other
hand, as Dowrick and DeLong point out, globalization and convergence
did not go hand in hand during the ﬁrst era of globalization in the years be-
fore World War I. Rather, convergence was limited to a narrow charmed
circle of countries consisting of some western and middle European coun-
tries and their more temperate colonies.
In many ways, this is surprising. Factors of production, including both
capital and labor, as well as technologies for production were shifted
around the globe because of this globalization. Yet the eﬀects on incomes
outside of the charmed circle are argued to be small. As the authors explain,
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1. Of course, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) represent an important exception.The British Empire brought the rubber plant to Malaysia. British in-
vestors ﬁnanced the movement of indentured workers south from China
to Malaysia to work the plantations to produce the rubber to satisfy de-
mand back in the world economy’s core. The British Empire brought the
tea plant from China to Ceylon. British investors ﬁnanced the movement
of Tamils from India across the strait to work the plantations to produce
the tea to satisfy demand from the British actual and would-be middle
classes. But these did nottrigger any rapid growth in real wages. They did
not trigger any acceleration in productivity growth or industrialization.
They did not trigger any rapid growth in factory employment, or any con-
vergence to the world’s economic core.
Why the diﬀerence between the two eras? And in particular, why did
globalization in the ﬁrst era not trigger rapid growth and convergence? In
my discussion, I will comment on each of these eras and make an eﬀort to
suggest one possible resolution to the puzzle.
Let me begin with some remarks on globalization and convergence dur-
ing the second half of the twentieth century. Until recently, I was under the
impression that the absolute divergence in output per worker across coun-
tries that characterizes most of history had largely been halted, at least since
1970 or so. Although it is well known that there has not been any conver-
gence in output per worker for the world as a whole, my impression was that
the divergence had largely stopped.2
In fact, as Dowrick and DeLong document in table 4.1 of the paper, this
absolute divergence largely continued throughout the second half of the
twentieth century. This is especially apparent in the per capita GDP data,
as shown in ﬁgure 4C.1. The data here are from the Penn World Tables
through 1992 and from the World Bank until 1997.
According to this ﬁgure, the standard deviation of the log of GDP per
capita across 109 countries shows a steady increase. In 1960, this standard
deviation was about 0.9 and by 1997 it had risen to more than 1.2. To inter-
pret these numbers, recall that if countries were normally distributed, then
4 standard deviations would span about 95 percent of the countries. This
suggests that the ratio of the second-richest country in the sample to the sec-
ond-poorest country would be a factor of e4 0.9   36 in 1960 and would rise
to e4 1.2   122 in 1997. These numbers turn out to be oﬀ just a little: The ra-
tio of GDP per capita in the richest country to that in the poorest country
was 39 in 1960 and 112 in 1997.
To avoid an undue inﬂuence from outliers, ﬁgure 4C.1 also plots the ra-
tio of incomes between the ﬁfth-richest and ﬁfth-poorest countries over
time. This ratio rises from about 20 in 1960 to nearly 30 in 1990 and then
rises quite sharply to more than 40 by 1997.
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2. In my defense, if one looks at GDP per worker using the Summers-Heston (1991) data up
until the late 1980s, this is the impression one gets.To  what extent are these changes inﬂuenced by globalization? Figure
4C.2 provides another look at changes in the dispersion of per capita GDP,
this time splitting countries into two groups, “open” and “closed.” The
open countries are those that were classiﬁed by Sachs and Warner (1995) as
being open for at least half of the years during the period 1950–94.3
Among countries classiﬁed as open, income dispersion generally de-
creased over the 1960–97 period, with the bulk of the decline coming by
1970. Among countries classiﬁed as closed, dispersion increased slightly,
again with the bulk of the change coming before 1970. However it is the “be-
tween” rather than the “within” evidence that is perhaps most informative
with respect to globalization and convergence. First, the dispersion among
the open countries is substantially less than the dispersion among the
closed countries. The open countries are richer and less dispersed than the
closed countries. Finally, between these two groups of countries, however,
income dispersion increased substantially between 1960 and 1997, with the
ratio of median incomes rising from 3 in 1960 to 8 by 1997.
Dowrick and DeLong document a related point, which is that the eﬀects
of openness on growth seem to have weakened after 1980 relative to before.
One might reach a similar conclusion from this ﬁgure, but it is unclear if this
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Fig. 4C.1 The dispersion of GDP per capita, 1960–97
Source: Author’s calculations using the extension of the Penn World Tables created by East-
erly and Yu (2000). One hundred nine countries are represented.
3. The actual openness data used are those from Hall and Jones (1999) and include some im-
puted values.conclusion is warranted. As time has passed, a larger number of countries
have opened their economies, but the classiﬁcation in the ﬁgure is held con-
stant. Some of the weakening of the eﬀects of openness apparent in the ﬁg-
ure, then, could be an artifact of this classiﬁcation.
In this most recent era, then, globalization and convergence appear to be
linked. The tentative evidence presented here is not nearly persuasive, but
there is a large literature on this question and Dowrick and DeLong them-
selves bring new evidence to bear.
What, then, about the ﬁrst era of globalization? An aspect of the quota-
tion at the beginning of my comment that strikes me as quite provocative is
the claim that globalization did not have a substantial impact on the coun-
tries outside of the charmed circle, in what we might call the “poor periph-
ery.” The lack of global convergence during this ﬁrst era could occur as
growth rates increased in the charmed circle but remained unchanged and
lower in the poor periphery. Alternatively, globalization could have raised
growth rates in all countries that took part, but it could have raised them
disproportionately in the charmed circle. In fact, I’d like to suggest that
something closer to this second alternative may have been going on.
Consider the following possible scenario. In the charmed circle, industri-
alization was well under way, and these economies had already reached
their take-oﬀ stage by 1870; globalization then increased growth even fur-
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Fig. 4C.2 Dispersion: Open versus closed countries
Source: Author’s calculations using the extension of the Penn World Tables created by East-
erly and Yu (2000). Thirty-three countries are classiﬁed as open, and 76 are classiﬁed as
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Fig. 4C.3 Growth rates in the ﬁrst globalization era
Note: Upper-case letters indicate countries in the “charmed circle,” and lower-case letters in-
dicate countries in the “poor periphery.” Source: Author’s calculations using Maddison
(1995).
ther. In the poor periphery, globalization began the take-oﬀprocess and led
these countries closer to industrialization. It is possible that globalization
itself did promote convergence around the world, but the continued indus-
trialization of the charmed circle kept their growth rates rising. By imagin-
ing two S-shaped take-oﬀcurves, one can easily see how something like this
is possible: Divergence results simply because the charmed circle took oﬀ
sooner and has reached the steep part of its S curve. I will show the empir-
ical version of these S-shaped curves in ﬁgure 4C.4.
Some evidence for the rapid growth and convergence within the charmed
circle and the lack of rapid growth outside of this circle can be seen in ﬁg-
ure 4C.3. This ﬁgure plots per capita GDP growth between 1870 and 1913
against the initial level of per capita GDP in 1870. The uppercase letters
correspond to the countries in the charmed circle, and the lowercase letters
represent other countries for which Maddison (1995) reports data. The
charmed circle consists of richer countries that generally exhibit faster
growth than the other countries of the world. In addition, one can see the
suggestive negative relationship between growth rates and initial income
levels for these charmed countries, whereas the countries in the poor pe-
riphery lie to the southwest of this growth frontier.
However, it would not be correct to think that the countries outside of the
charmed circle experienced no growth. Mexico exhibited the fastest growth
of the poor periphery, with growth faster than that in most of the charmed
countries, as it more than doubled its per capita GDP between 1870 and1913. Even China and India exhibited substantial growth, with incomes ris-
ing by more than 30 percent in the former country and nearly 20 percent in
the latter.
Was this growth in the poor periphery a continuation of a previous trend,
or did it represent a change, perhaps associated with globalization? Figure
4C.4sheds light on this question by plotting the level of GDP per capita for
a typical charmed country and a typical country in the periphery.4
An important fact apparent in this ﬁgure is that growth rates in the poor
periphery were substantially higher in the ﬁrst era of globalization (1870–
1913) than they were over the preceding half century. To take Maddison’s
data at face value, average GDP per capita increased from about $750 in
1870 to more than $1,000 by 1913. Although it is true that this era of glob-
alization witnessed a divergence of incomes between the countries in the
charmed circle and those outside, this does not mean that globalization
brought no beneﬁts to the periphery, or even that it was not a force working
to promote convergence. A relevant question is the counterfactual: What
would have happened to the poor periphery in the absence of globalization?
It would be quite surprising if the substantial ﬂows of capital, labor, and
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Fig. 4C.4 Per capita GDP: Charmed circle versus poor periphery
Note: The two series plotted represent the typical experience for countries in the charmed
circle and the poor periphery. See ﬁgure 4C.1 for the countries in these two groups. The num-
bers above each line segment represent average annual growth rates. Source: Author’s calcu-
lations using Maddison (1995).
4. By typical, we mean the following. The level in 1870 is equal to the unweighted average of
the per capita GDPs in the two sets of countries. Values in previous and subsequent years are
computed using the unweighted average growth rate of the countries for which data are avail-
able in each sample relative to 1870.technology across countries did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the pe-
riphery. Figure 4C.4 suggests that the impact may have been large. Perhaps
globalization raised growth rates throughout the world, and perhaps the di-
vergence between the charmed circle and the poor periphery would have
been even greater in the absence of globalization.
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